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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper a system termed VIGILANT+ is outlined, which utilises situation awareness for the purposes of 
enabling distributed, autonomic, sensor management, so that savings on consumption of network resources can 
be achieved. VIGILANT+ is a novel proposition allowing deployed, unattended, wireless sensor nodes to self-
organise into dynamic groups and self-manage their transmissions efficiently, according to a current common 
mission objective. Firstly, a distributed situation assessment system named PORTENT models, detects and 
characterises potential situations occurring within an uncertain environment, using the metric, quality of 
surveillance information (QoSI). Secondly, a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is utilised to understand and 
analyse the significance associated with the potential situation, primarily to enable deployed sensors to self-
organise and assign themselves to mission objectives autonomously. Thirdly, a system is introduced for 
distributed autonomic transmission control, which enables the efficient management of sensor network resource 
consumption. Simulations have been undertaken to verify the integrated VIGILANT+ concepts and to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in improving network efficiency, without compromising 
the presentation of mission surveillance utility. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Continuing advances in sensor related technologies (battery and low power computation capabilities), including 
those in pervasive computing are opening opportunities for the deployment and operation of autonomous 
wireless sensor networks [1]. In addition, a highly distributed ad-hoc infrastructure can support fundamentally 
new ways of designing and implementing unattended ground sensor (UGS) networks for surveillance 
applications, in order to provide support in mission objective capabilities, such as threat presence detection, 
classification and geo-location. In this paper we focus on threat presence detection (mission objective 1) and 
geo-location (mission objective 2) capability. 
The characteristic nature of UGS surveillance operations requires however dynamic, intelligent, sensor 
management decisions regarding efficient consumption of sensor resources without compromising the 
objectives of the mission. Efficient management of resource is a necessity since the nature of UGS deployment 
 
 
can prevent devices being accessible for battery replenishment for long periods of time [2].  In this paper, a 
system named VIGILANT+ is outlined, which utilises a distributed sensor self-management approach to 
improve robustness to node failure and reduce communications load significantly over the more traditional 
centralised or task driven approaches [3].  
1.1 Related Work 
 
Clustering in ad-hoc sensor networks is an effective technique for achieving scalability and prolonged network 
lifetime [4-9]. A well-known clustering algorithm for continuous data centric application gathering sensor 
networks is the Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) mechanism [5]. LEACH is a distributed 
single hop algorithm and includes inherent characteristics such as, self-configuration and localised data 
transmission control using Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA).  
In surveillance scenarios, self-organisation to perform energy efficient threat geo-localisation is equally 
important, as detailed in [6 -9]. Dynamic clustering for acoustic target tracking (DCATT) [6], proposes a simple, 
physical based localisation view, based on estimated distances derived from received signal energy levels from 
the sensing field. The locus of a potential target is dependent on the level of shared signal energy between two 
sensors, characterised by a defined single signal threshold.  
In addition, the above mentioned schemes [5-9], offer disadvantages by incorporating task driven criteria for 
sensor management. In [5], CHs are rotated according to metrics such as, battery energy level, transmission 
power or network connectivity, while in [6] CH’s with the greatest received energy are selected, according to 
the defined signal threshold. Such criteria offer drawbacks due to random rotation of cluster heads (CHs), by 
introducing considerable re-setup delay of the clusters, increasing communication overhead (energy 
consumption) and congestion (latency). This can also lead to degradation in surveillance performance by 
depleting network resources rapidly as in [5] or introducing higher target location errors, as in [6-9], in 
conditions where the sensing environment is corrupted with high levels of noise, leading to greater group 
instability.  
In addition, [5-9] do not consider the potential resource benefit savings that can be achieved through networking 
according to the derived understanding of the external operating environment, from captured sensor data. Recent 
initiatives have begun to address the problem of organising nodes according to the level of understanding about 
their environment, so that further improvements in operational and network performance can be achieved [10-
12], however this view is mostly taken towards the network and medium access control layers. 
 
 
 
1.2 VIGILANT+ Distributed Autonomic Surveillance Networking 
 
In this paper, VIGILANT+, outlines a new approach towards self-organisation and management of network 
resource consumption for surveillance missions. This is achieved by taking a “situation awareness” perspective 
of the surveillance environment, which mainly addresses the drawbacks of existing systems highlighted in the 
previous section, by minimising on the task driven criteria required for sensor management. Situation awareness 
(SA) is an application-orientated approach, offering a different perspective to [10-12] and can be neatly 
described through expanding Endsley’s “tripartite” model [13]:  
• Level 1-Perception-involves the correct identification of entity elements (e.g. type of threat) as well as 
their combined detection characteristics (e.g. accuracy, identity, certainty and timeliness), representing 
a measure of the detection information captured, by the distributed surveillance network [14]. 
• Level 2-Comprehension-involves derivation of the significance associated with uncertain sensor data, 
enabling relevant decision making and confidence in mission objective understanding (“context”). 
• Level 3- Projection-the ability to project future “context” of the mission objective environment based 
on potential association of the fragmented sensor data, within a temporal frame.  
Through integrating levels 1 and 2, VIGILANT+ minimises random rotation of CHs, as currently with [5-9], by 
ensuring CHs are only self-nominated according to the neighbourhood sensor, which registers the highest 
change in monitored threat dynamics, further detailed in section 2. In addition, VIGILANT+ also caters against 
the effects of the noisy and false alarm surveillance environment, primarily through level 1 and 2 operations, 
which can compromise on mission objective utility and is something not actively considered in [5-9]. In this 
paper, we also improve on [6-9] by not considering a signal energy threshold mechanism for target localisation, 
but rather self-organise by considering  locally derived threat awareness using Bayesian techniques and include 
an evaluation of the  relative positions of deployed sensors to the current monitored threat, in terms of geometric 
dilution of precision (GDOP), for improved geo-location performance. 
By also considering the confidence in mission objective “context” in level 2, VIGILANT+ can allow deployed 
UGS networks to conserve and self-manage their lower layer operational resources efficiently, such as 
communication energy (longevity) and bandwidth (latency) consumption, by minimising on the need for 
continuous updates, as currently done in [4-6]. In addition to our previous work [15], this paper also highlights 
the network resource efficiency benefits that can be achieved, by incorporating a distributed, mission objective, 
autonomic approach, as shown below, rather than the more traditional centralised approaches detailed in [5-9]: 
 
 
• Derivation of confidence through expansion of level 2 “context”, allowing deployed sensors to assign 
themselves to a particular mission objective autonomously. 
• A partial and fully observable Markov Decision Process enabling autonomic transmission control, so 
that further benefits can be achieved in conserving on network resource consumption. 
As with current LEACH operation [5], utilising TDMA in periods of low surveillance activity, can introduce 
bandwidth inefficiencies by non-utilisation of time slots for packet transmission. Also the medium access 
control strategies used in [6-9] are primarily pure contention access protocols, which can result in packets being 
dropped during high surveillance activity. In this paper, we manage this dual scenario by proposing a 
contention-schedule channel access mechanism, through our autonomic transmission control methodology, 
detailed in section 3. This allows a duty-cycle approach towards localised sensor channel contention access, 
where access periods are defined according to the evaluated urgency concerning the monitored threat, to 
improve on bandwidth utilisation, but without compromising on mission objective surveillance utility. Access 
periods defined in this way become sensor unique and can assist to balance the surveillance reporting load 
appropriately across the deployed network. Figure 1, illustrates and summarises the novelty of our proposed 
method for improving on operational resource efficiencies, through adaptive networking according to the SA of 
the surveillance environment. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 details VIGILANT+ self-organisation. Section 3 
details the autonomic transmission control methodology, by utilising the underlying mission objective 
“context”. Section 4 details VIGILANT+ system performance and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. VIGILANT+  SELF-ORGANISATION 
 
VIGILANT+ self-organisation is primarily focused on sensors establishing their localised “context” of the 
present situation (e.g. awareness to a threat) in order to allow sensor self-assignment to a particular mission 
objective.  Self-organisation based on a common “context” can facilitate operational effectiveness by: 
• Providing robustness in the probability of detection to common perceived events of interest, which 
consequently increases surveillance provision utility, as detailed in section 2.1 and 2.2.  
• Activating only those sensors currently providing a relevant sensing coverage to a security-sensitive 
area, thus propagating increased relevance in surveillance provision, as detailed in section 2.3. Non-
active sensors therefore participate less in group communication, providing further network resource 
consumption efficiencies. 
 
 
• Reducing the influence of sensors which share low common mission objective “context” (outliers) 
which can decrease surveillance provision utility, as detailed in section 2.3.  
2.1 VIGILANT+ Level 1 – Perception 
False alarms have a distinct impact on perception and mission performance since they relate to threat detection. 
A low false alarm rate, which is needed to avoid unnecessary responses, involves a larger sample set being 
collected for threat verification, implying greater sampling energy consumption and reduced timeliness. A 
system that has self-adjustable sensitivity to accommodate sensing environment uncertainties is therefore 
beneficial. Our evaluated situation assessment system, named PORTENT, comprises level 1 perception, 
accommodating the adjustable sensitivity requirement [16]. 
As shown in figure 2, PORTENT comprises a combined “fast” but less accurate and “slow” but more accurate 
validation system. “Fast” response is based on single sensory observations modelled using standard signal 
detection theory [17]. “Slow” response is modelled by integrating sensory samples over time, using the 
sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), in terms of the Neyman-Pearson (NP) lemma [18]. The SPRT tests two 
alternative hypotheses, representing the presence and absence of threat while updating the relative likelihood 
ratio of each as new sensory samples arrive. A decision in favour of a hypothesis is made by comparing the 
updated ratio against the NP detection sensitivity, which is designed to self-adjust in order to maximise the 
detection probability subject to the current false alarm. This assists in minimising on both false alarm detection 
and the need for extensive sampling.  
For threat presence characterisation, PORTENT specifically uses detection accuracy (q1), detection certainty 
(q2) and timeliness (q3) quality factors. A linear weighted fusion strategy is used by assigning normalized 
weights (Wb), to capture localised quality of surveillance information (QoSI), as shown in (1). 
∑
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bb q*WQoSI                                                                                                                                                   (1) 
where T = Number of Quality Factors Used. 
The PORTENT system provides strategies for efficiently combining both “fast” and “slow” response systems, 
to provide increased detection accuracy, certainty and timely situation assessment performance. The results of 
our evaluation studies indicate that incorporating PORTENT option 2 increases overall QoSI [16]. 
 
 
 
2.2 VIGILANT+ Level 2 – Mission Objective Surveillance Comprehension and Analysis 
Situations occurring in an uncertain environment require a level of cognition to derive “context” of those 
situations. Level 2 utilises an action orientated design approach [19], in the form of a Bayesian Belief Network 
(BBN), as shown in figure 3. A BBN is a directed acyclic graph, using a collection of nodes denoting the 
random variables representing the situation domain. Corresponding links between nodes define the casual 
relationships between them, with conditional probability tables (CPTs) encoding the quantitative influence. 
Where no link exists between nodes, quantitative influence is given by marginal probabilities. Table 1 
summarises the relevant probability derivations from figure 3, for making “context” based decisions at local 
sensors, concerning the current single threat situation for each mission objective. 
2.3 VIGILANT+ “Context” Querying for Sensor Mission Objective Self-Assignment 
Ad-hoc group self-organisation of single hop sensors can be enhanced through assigning sensors that share 
common “context” to a mission objective. Using “context” for self-organisation involves procedures which must 
support the following considerations: 
• Dynamics: Groups must provide adaptability, depending on changes to “context”, allowing sensors to 
leave and join at any time, during a mission. 
• Group Initiator re-election: Dynamic re-election of new CHs is imperative to maintaining relevant 
surveillance report aggregation, while minimising communication overhead. 
Bearing in mind these considerations, mission self-assignment can be restricted to querying about certainty in 
“context”, where communication efficiency relies on mission objective specific “context” instead of traditional 
IP-style addressing. “Context” centricity enforces uncoupled coordination, where distributed sensors are 
modelled as a set of components interacting with each other through the sensor analysing and reacting to their 
“context” independently. This supports flexibility within dynamic UGS surveillance network scenarios.  
The certainty factor (CF) model [20] can establish the degree of certainty which sensors have regarding a 
specific “context” of the mission objective. CF operates according to proportional measures in belief (MB) and 
measures in disbelief (MD) towards a certain hypothesis. The hypothesis stems from whether a distributed 
sensor should assign themselves to a specific mission objective, according to its current “context”, as shown in 
(2), using table 2, derived from figure 3.   
)MD,MBmin(1
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−=                                                                                                                              (2)         
 
 
Sensor self-assignment is initiated by the group initiator (GI) publish request, represented by the current sensor 
which perceives the highest current threat (Threat-“High”), calculated as detailed in table 1, entry 4 and shown 
in (3). 
))"High"Threat(p1()"High"Threat(p −−>−                                                                                                             (3) 
A combined CF “Mission Objective” evaluation, as shown in (4), quantifies the degree of certainty that a GI 
and a sensor should form a partnership due to their respective current “context” in a mission objective. CF “GI” 
is calculated in the same way as (2).  
Figure 4, illustrates the overall publish-subscribe “context” centric operation, for GI mission objective led 
sensor self-assignment and group self-organisation.  
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
−
+
++<
−+≥
=
)|"Sensor"CF|,|"GI"CFmin(|1
)"Sensor"CF"GI"CF(
:Otherwise
)"GI"CF1("Sensor"CF"GI"CF:0"Sensor"CFand"GI"CFif
)"GI"CF1("Sensor"CF"GI"CF:0"Sensor"CFand"GI"CFif
"ObjectiveMission"CF              (4)                                                               
 
2.4 VIGILANT+ Group Initiator Re-Election 
GI re-election is dynamically conducted in the process of a mission. Assigned sensors rely on the current GI 
mission objective “context” centric address (GImocca) sent in the initial publish request, to re-evaluate whether to 
initiate “new” GI status, as shown in (5).  
StatusquestReObjectiveMissionGI"New"Publish,Then
)GI()"context"objectivemissioncurrentinConfidence(if mocca≥
                                                                    (5)               
Upon the condition in (5) being satisfied, the new GI re-evaluates the distributed mission objective “context” 
certainty, as shown in figure 4.The resulting new self-organised group further facilitates maintaining relevant 
on-going aggregation in surveillance information utility. 
3. VIGILANT+ AUTONOMIC NETWORK CONTROL 
Autonomic network control is orientated towards the management of network resources at infrastructure level, 
through applying feedback upon temporal environmental dynamics. Being efficient to network resource 
consumption implies a methodology, which provides projection capabilities (level 3) concerning the “context” 
to a current specific mission objective. This can be formalised using a random discrete time state representation, 
through either a Markov Decision Process (MDP) or Partially Observable MDP (POMDP) [21], detailed in 
 
 
sections 3.1 and 3.2. Being in a particular state signifies an evaluation of the current shared “context” to a 
specific mission objective at that point in time, detailed in sections 3.3 and 3.4. This enables us to make 
necessary transmission control decisions (selection, scheduling and prioritisation), detailed in sections 3.5 to 3.7.  
3.1 MDP Formulation for Transmission Control 
A MDP representation stipulates that a belief probability towards the current state environment is conditionally 
independent of all previous states and actions taken due to the Markov property exhibiting memory-less 
operation [21]. This property implies current actions regarding transmission decision making are dependent only 
on the current state, as shown in figures 5(a) and (b). Evaluating a current belief state (BSk+i) to facilitate 
transition to the next state (STATEk+i), where i=0 at initialisation, is based only on the conditional joint 
probability of current observation zk+i (A1) and current action taken ak+i (A3), as shown in (6). 
),|( 31 AASTATEpBS ikik ++ =                                                                                                                               (6) 
From figure 5(a), further GI updates are utilised, to deduce the current observable shared state environment. A 
consequence of utilising further GI updates is consumption of more network communication energy and 
bandwidth. We seek to explore this, with a view to considering the increase in surveillance information utility if 
any, due to an informed perspective about the current shared state environment, at the expense of more network 
resource consumption.  
3.2 POMDP Formulation for Transmission Control 
A POMDP implementation models the decision making process in which it is assumed that the system 
dynamics are determined by an MDP, but the decision maker (UGS) has an incomplete perspective regarding 
the shared state environment. Operating within a partial observable state environment requires feedback control 
of previous actions and observations [21]. The essential task for POMDP transmission feedback-control 
implementation is belief state estimation (BSE), as shown in figure 6(a) and (b). BSE represents the most 
probable view of the current shared state, given past experiences. Evaluating a current BSE (BSEk+i) , to 
facilitate transition to the next state (STATEk+i), where i=1 at initialisation, is based on the conditional joint 
probability of the current observation zk+i (A1), previous action ak-i (A3) and previous BSEk-i (A4), given in (7). 
),,|( 431 AAASTATEpBSE ikik ++ =                                                                                                                       (7) 
From figure 6(a), we represent partial observable operation, through not relying on further GI updates, to 
substantiate whether this will provide improved network longevity and bandwidth efficiency savings at the 
expense of any degradation in reported surveillance information utility.  
 
 
3.3 Determination of Shared Mission Objective 1 “Context” 
For mission objective 1 the joint probability for shared non-common threat awareness “context” between the GI 
and its corresponding group member  is a random variable, U, with probability density function (PDF1) and 
cumulative distribution function (CDF1), U~ N(µ , σ2 ). Additionally the joint probability in shared common 
threat awareness “context” is a random variable, T, with a PDF2 and CDF2 , T~ N(µ , σ2).  
Determining the level of common “context” is based on the threshold S, chosen as the intersection point of the 
two respective PDF’s, as to minimise the sum of probabilities for incorrect determination of common “context” 
being made. The probability of correct detection in common threat awareness “context” (P1) forms the basis for 
eventual BSk+i or BSEk+i evaluation, given in (8). 
),|( 31 APSTATEpBS ikik ++ = And ),,|( 431 AAPSTATEpBSE ikik ++ =                                                                  (8) 
where, P1 = 1 – CDF2 (S)      
3.4 Determination of Shared Mission Objective 2 “Context” 
We assume sensors have the ability to obtain current threat position (xThreat, yThreat) using techniques such as time 
difference of arrival, to calculate current geometric dilution of precision (GDOPk), with respect to the GI. 
GDOPk measures accuracy in shared geo-location “context”, quantifying the mapping of measurement errors 
into position errors, magnified by the geometric relation of sensors to threat geometry [22]. The geometry 
matrix HT H, at each time instant, for N active sensors, is expressed in (9). In all cases we assume, GI (xGI, yGI) 
and active sensor (xi, yi) positions are known.  
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Since the matrix (HT H) is symmetric and positive definite, all eigenvalues λ1, λ2 are real and positive. The trace 
of the matrix (HT H) is then equal to the sum of the eigenvalues given in (10). 
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GDOPk is therefore given as shown in (11). 
1)( −= HHtraceGDOP Tk                                                                                                                                (11)  
Utilising the GDOPk measure to serve as an approximation of the current threat location (CTL) , in terms of 
circular error probable (CEP) [23], we can obtain a likelihood measure for common “context” (Q1), forming the 
basis for eventual BSk+i or BSEk+i evaluation, given in (12). 
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3.5 Mission Objective Transmission Control: Selection 
Selection for transmission, at each decision epoch, can be formulated in terms of state information gain using 
information discrimination techniques such as Rényi divergence, also known as α-divergence [24]. Utilising a 
state information gain approach forms a direct measure on the quality for sensor transmission selection, this 
being either to select transmission or not, with an expected utility calculated for each. The calculation of 
information gain between two probability densities p1 and p0 using Rényi divergence denoted by, (p1 || p0), is 
given in (13), where the α parameter is used to adjust how heavily one emphasises the tail of the two 
distributions p1 and p0. 
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In the limiting case of α → 1 the Rényi divergence becomes the commonly used Kullback-Leibler (KL) 
discrimination, given in (14). 
∫=→ )(
)(
ln)()||(lim
1
0
0011 xp
xp
xpppDαα                                                                                                           (14) 
If probability state representations are taken from a normal distribution, p1 ~ N (µ1, σ12) and p0 ~ N (µ0, σ02) the 
KL discrimination (DKL) is shown in (15).   
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For mission objective 1 (M1) operation, the requirement is to have as much divergence between p1 (non-
common threat awareness) and p0 (common threat awareness) to increase information gain. Expected Utility 
(EU) in (16) illustrates how risk attitudes are managed according to current uncertainty towards high threat 
presence awareness.  
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For mission objective 2 (M2) operation, the requirement is to have as much convergence between p1 
(GDOPMAX) and p0 (GDOPk) to increase information gain. Risk attitudes are modelled by (17) on GDOPk, this 
being a direct approximation on the current CEP, a measure for geo-location accuracy. 
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Transmission is selected by ensuring that the current expected utility for “yes” transmission is greater than or 
equal to the expected utility of selecting “no” transmission, as given in (16) and (17) but with complementary 
weighting. 
3.6 Mission Objective Transmission Control: Scheduling 
Scheduling can be made according to BSk+i or BSEk+i which represents a belief transition probability from the 
current to future state environments. Figures 5(b) and 6(b), illustrate the decision for selecting transmission 
scheduling, with both conditions derived to provide group stability, for situations where no state “contextual” 
discrepancy occurs. In mission objective 1 this constitutes non-scheduling as long as the BSk+i or BSEk+i adds to 
an increasing level in shared threat awareness “context” as evaluated in (8). In mission objective 2 this 
constitutes scheduling as long as the BSk+i or BSEk+i increases the level in shared geo-location “context” 
representing improved GDOPk from the previous state, which is a direct approximation of the current 
improvement in CEP, as shown in (12). 
3.7 Mission Objective Transmission Control: Prioritisation 
In order to ensure reliable surveillance report delivery and promote network longevity and bandwidth efficiency, 
sensors which are scheduled for transmission determine a service priority time, based on BSk+i or BSEk+i. The 
service priority time (M) is evaluated in terms of a shared state environment which continues for a total H time 
steps (seconds), as shown in (18).  
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Derived M is dependent on the degrees of shared “context” present, with respect to the current GI. A higher 
belief state transition probability implies a higher M (lower urgency) since the uncertainty in the shared state 
environment is low. This allows unique sensor provisioning, through individual schedule channel access 
periods, promoting bandwidth efficiency and minimal congestion for group surveillance reporting. Figure 7, 
details the service priority time algorithm. Figure 8 illustrates the integrated process for VIGILANT+ distributed 
sensor management, for the purposes of self-assignment and self-managed transmission control.                                                                                                                                                                 
4. VIGILANT+ SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
System performance is evaluated using the OMNeT++ simulation platform [25]. We deploy a static grid 
network within a 1000 × 1000 m2 region, using a total of 9 sensors. We assume an intruder will be approaching 
the region in the near future and subsequently sensing operations are active [26]. Surveillance monitoring 
concerns a mobile target moving with constant velocity, v m/s, in a diagonal trajectory. Simulations are based on 
a sampling rate of 100 samples/sec, sensing range of 1000m, no packet loss and 500m transmission range, with 
the IEEE 802.11, distributed coordination function in basic access mode, for medium access control. 
Surveillance performance is measured either against level-1 threat detection certainty (TDC), through varying 
the mean separation in yes threat, no threat probability occurrence distributions or velocity of the mobile target, 
v m/s.  
For energy consumption performance the model of [5] is used, with an arbitrary packet size of 500 bits. From 
figure 5(a), updates are only sent when the GI confirms a positive PORTENT detection, (section 2.1, fig.2), 
named, MDP-Option 1 or when the GI condition for confidence in current threat, as shown in table 1, entry 6, is 
less than the previous confidence named, MDP-Option 2. Geo-location accuracy is measured in terms of CEP-
50%, defined as the radius of the circle that has its centre at the true position, containing half the realisation 
uncertainties of the random vector. Figures 9-12, give performance results for a realistic joint mission objective 
surveillance operation.  
4.1 Surveillance Utility Performance 
The results of figures 9 and 10 (a) and (b) show that surveillance utility for threat presence detection (QoSI) and 
geo-location (CEP-50%) is jointly improved by incorporating a joint threat presence and geo-location “context” 
methodology, as highlighted in section 2. Figure 9 shows that continuous updates utilising all one hop 
 
 
neighbours (LEACH), without consideration of shared threat presence detection “context” decreases QoSI, 
especially within low certainty surveillance environments, by approximately 13%. Figure 9, also highlights that 
reduction in influence of outliers within the network, using the operation outlined in figure 4, increases 
robustness in QoSI utility. Figures 10 (a) and (b) indicate distributed geo-location performance (VIGILANT+) is 
comparable to a centralised operation utilising all one hop neighbours (LEACH), with only approximately a 7% 
loss in accuracy. As expected, geo-location operation can never be truly distributed, as shown through the 
LEACH results and should be kept central to the GI for improved performance. Figures 10 (a) and (b) also 
illustrate non-integration of geo-location “context” [15] in terms of GDOP, or reliance on received energy 
corrupted with noise from the  sensing environment (DACTT), can result in geo-location performance shortfalls. 
As shown in figures 9 and 10, utilising derived mission objective “context”, primarily through level 2 Bayesian 
Belief Network operation, can assist in filtering uncertainty towards a current threat situation, in order to 
improve on surveillance utility performance. 
4.2 Communication Energy Consumption Performance  
Figures 11 (a) and (b) show managing transmissions according to mission objective “context” can minimise on 
non-essential communication, which ultimately improves network longevity and prevents surveillance utility 
performance degradation, as shown in figures 9 and 10. Network communication energy consumption for 
operational longevity is improved through distributed self-managed transmission control, as highlighted in 
section 3, by making self-adaptive transmission control decisions according to shared “context” in a specific 
mission objective. A Centralised approach for surveillance updating as in our previous work [15], or continuous 
updating as in LEACH, do not promote this and as a result increase energy consumption. Being able to make 
self-adaptive transmission control decisions is imperative since, sensor nodes are typically restricted in their 
energy resources, therefore non –essential communication and overhead should be kept to a minimum, in order 
to prolong network lifetime, which VIGILANT+ operation clearly promotes. 
4.3 Bandwidth Efficiency Performance 
Results in figure 12 (a) and (b) indicate that utilising a surveillance service priority scheduling algorithm, figure 
7, coupled with a POMDP methodology, allows a duty cycle benefit approach for individual sensor channel 
contention access, to improve on bandwidth efficiency. Figures 12 (a) and (b) show that a contention-schedule 
medium access control, where access periods vary according to shared mission objective “context” , offers 
better efficiency as compared to purely schedule based (LEACH) operation, through TDMA control, which was 
 
 
found in our simulation studies to have an average 250 msec latency delay. In addition, bandwidth efficiency is 
increased, without degradation in mission objective surveillance utility, as shown in figures 9 and 10. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Efficient UGS surveillance operations require systems that can manage mission objective priorities 
autonomically in a distributed manner, within environmental (false alarm) and network resource consumption 
constraints. VIGILANT+ adopts a distributed “situation aware” design approach for sensor network self-
management, in order to provide an improvement in operational effectiveness. Such an approach firstly allows 
for autonomic organisation of sensor groups to meet the needs of a specific mission objective, within 
environmental constraints. Secondly, we utilise a MDP or POMDP methodology for autonomic network 
control, in order to enable efficient management of network resource consumption, without compromising on 
mission objective surveillance utility. Results indicate that VIGILANT+ can improve on network resource 
consumption by adapting according to the “situation awareness” perspective of the surveillance environment, 
primarily through level 3 operation, as illustrated in figures 1 and 8.  
We also conclude that a POMDP implementation offers improved overall network efficiency performance, 
compared with a fully observable MDP approach, primarily due to a reduction in use of further GI observation 
updates, with only a small decrease in geo-location utility performance resulting.  Further work is required 
however to extend the POMDP operation for adapting decision epochs, figure 6(b), matched to the 
characteristics of the surveillance threat and experimentation for VIGILANT+ performance within an unreliable 
channel communication environment. 
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Probability Expression Probability Derivation from figure 3 using CPT Analysis 
1. p( Yes Intruder Present – “True” (C) ) P(C | Threat Presence True) * P(r) + P(C| Threat Presence False)* (1 – 
P(r)) 
 
2. p( No Intruder Present – “True” (D) ) P(D | Threat Presence True) * P(r) + P(D | Threat Presence False)* (1 
– P(r)) 
 
3. p(Current Threat Level – “High” (F) ) [P(F| C,D) * P(C) * P(D)]  +  [P(F | ~C,D) * P(~C) * P(D)]  +  
[P(F|C,~D) * P(C) * P(~D)]  +  [P(F | ~C,~D) * P(~C) * P(~D)] 
4.Group Formation 
  p(Threat-High) 
P(Yes-“Form”| F)* P(F)  + P(Yes-“Form”| ~F)*P(~F) 
 
5.p(Local Awareness to Current Threat – “High” (L) ) [P(L | C,F) * P(C) * P(F)] + [P(L | ~C,F) * P(~C) * P(F)] +             
[P(L | C,~F) * P(C) * P(~F)] + [P( L | ~C,~D) * P(~C) * P(~F)] 
6. Mission Objective 1 
  p(Confidence in Current Threat – “High” (Q) )  
P(Q | L) * P(L) + P(Q| ~L)* P(~L) 
 
7. p(L and Position Observation Estimate (POE) – “High” (E) ) [P(E | L,POE) * P(L) * P(POE)] + [P(E | ~L,POE) * P(~L) * P(POE)] 
+ [P(E | L,~POE) * P(L) * P(~POE)] + [P( E | ~L,~POE) * P(~L) * 
P(~POE)] 
8. Mission Objective 2 
  p(Confidence in Geo-Location – “High” (S) ) 
P (S | E) * P(E) + P(S | ~E)* P(~E) 
 
 
Table1. Probability derivations for the purposes of initiating group formation and making “context” informed 
decisions regarding a specific mission objective 
 
 
Table2. MB and MD expressions for local UGS mission objective CF evaluation, using table 1 
Figure Captions: 
Figure 1. VIGILANT+ approach to SA informed autonomic networking 
Figure 2. PORTENT situation assessment architecture 
Figure 3. VIGILANT+ BBN for localised single threat mission objective situation analysis 
Figure 4. “Context” centric publish-subscribe querying for mission objective self-assignment. Feedback is used 
for non- subscribers to re-evaluate their position if “contextual” changes occur 
Figure 5. (a) MDP representation of the underlying shared state environment, (b) Projection of the decision 
chain to future states is driven by BSk. Temporal decision epoch frequencies for scheduling, depends on the 
variation of received GI updates  
 Mission Objective 1 – Threat Presence Mission Objective 2 – Threat Geo-Location 
 
Increased Belief 
(MB) Expression 
)L(p1
)L(p)L|ThreattoAwareness(p
−
−  
)E(p1
)E(p)E|AwarenessLocationGeo(p
−
−−  
 
 
 
Increased Disbelief 
(MD) Expression 
 
)L(p
)L|ThreattoAwareness(p)L(p −  
 
)E(p
)E|AwarenessLocationGeo(p)E(p −−  
 
 
Figure 6. (a) POMDP representation of the underlying shared state environment, (b) Projection of the decision 
chain to future states is driven by BSEk+i. Temporal decision epoch frequencies for scheduling, depends on the 
variation in localised sensor observations 
Figure 7. Service priority time algorithm governed by the complementary BSk+i or BSEk+i transition probability 
Figure 8. VIGILANT+ distributed autonomic sensor management 
Figure 9. Mission objective 1 performance, QoSI with level-1 TDC, v = 5m/s 
Figure 10. Mission objective 2 performance CEP-50% with v (m/s) (a) TDC = 0.01 (b) TDC = 0.9 
Figure 11. Communication energy consumption performance (a) TDC = 0.01 (b) TDC = 0.9 
Figure 12. Surveillance report update quality of service (latency) (a) TDC = 0.01 (b) TDC = 0.9 
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